Spectrum
Supportability Risk Assessments – Critical
to Milestone Approval!
The Problem —
Early consideration of spectrum supportability in
spectrum dependent (S-D) system acquisitions is a fundamental criterion that
must be satisfied before the DoD develops and fields communications-electronics
(CE) equipment and related weapons systems.
Development or acquisition of systems that meet operational
requirements, but fail to obtain spectrum supportability, means those systems
will not be allowed to operate in the United States or in host nations. These
systems create a potential for severe mutual interference between themselves
and other spectrum users, squander resources, and delay fielding warfighting
capabilities to field units.
“Spectrum Supportability” is defined as the
assessment as to whether the electromagnetic spectrum necessary to support
equipment is available for use by the system.
The assessment requires, at a minimum, receipt of equipment spectrum
certification, reasonable assurance of the availability of sufficient
frequencies for operation from host nations, and a consideration of ElectroMagnetic
Compatibility (EMC). Guidance for these requirements are found in DoDI 4650.01.
The Department of Defense has complementary policy instructions that
provide additional assurance that spectrum supportability can be achieved. The
interrelationship between Spectrum Supportability and E3 is depicted in the
figure below. The primary overlap occurs during the mutual concern for
achieving Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) and preventing EMI for S-D
systems and equipment.
It’s important to understand the critical nature of
spectrum supportability and why DoD procurement offices must include
this in any system planning involving radio frequency (RF) transmission,
reception, or control.
The other challenge we
face, and another reason why it is so important to manage this resource is
because we are constantly faced with competing users of our spectrum that want
us to give up the spectrum we are using. Commercial factors, increased spectrum use by
the military and even such things as directed energy weapons and GPS jamming
contribute to an increasing pressure on military use of the EM spectrum. Nearly every operational capability and
mission requirement demands spectrum use for collecting and distributing
information of all kinds, in systems such as ISR assets and
platforms and used in all domains – space, air, ground, maritime and even
cyberspace. Countless billions of
dollars have been invested in those capabilities. Likewise, billions of dollars have
been invested in capabilities that use information, i.e. warfighting
platforms across all those same domains.
The electromagnetic spectrum provides the pipeline that affords mobility
to that information is being squeezed and squeezed hard. The net result is an increasing restriction
on the expected and planned for free flow of information through this pipeline
down to a trickle, due to relative pennies on the dollar having been invested
in protecting
this EMS “maneuver space.”
-
Adversary factors listed represent technologies and methodologies that
our enemies are developing, producing and using to deny us access to our
information
-
Getting the experts involved early will save you money, time,
and aggravation in the end.
Spectrum access is
fundamental to all DoD missions.
On-demand access to the spectrum and electromagnetically compatible
operations in the EM environment cannot be assumed. The
first step is to realize that you need to plan and engineer this into your system
or capability. Then you must make sure
you have the resources on hand to deal with this. In the end, getting the experts involved
early will save you money, time, and aggravation. There are many
examples of how the failure to properly address spectrum supportability during
the design, test and production processes have caused program impacts in the
areas of schedules, missed Milestones, significant financial issues, and/or a
system that was produced with significant operational constraints on its use.
In the
acquisition process, spectrum management usually begins with equipment spectrum
certification, a process whereby a system is approved to operate in a
particular spectral band. To actually
operate the system, spectrum certification must be followed by obtaining a
frequency assignment. Obtaining
frequencies to operate equipment in the U.S. is a two-step process which is
managed by the submittal of a properly filled out DD Form 1494. The first step is Equipment Spectrum
Certification. The certification process assesses equipment transmit and
receive characteristics to determine if it complies with existing RF spectrum
regulations. The second step, Frequency
Assignment, coordinates operational use of specific frequencies within specific
bands among current users so that they do not interfere with each other. The Manual of Regulations and Procedures for
Radio Frequency Management, issued by NTIA, is the standard for both steps. The NTIA is the regulatory authority over all
federal equipment and spectrum in the US&P. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
regulates non-federal spectrum in the US&P.
The DD Form 1494, a document that captures an
exhaustive variety of technical data, serves two functions:
(1) Provides a uniform method to capture the basic spectrum-dependent and
operational parameters of military spectrum-dependent systems in a format that
can be easily provided to US National and host nation spectrum authorities
(2) Standardizes the format of the technical data required to be inserted
into DoD and national databases to generate frequency assignment approvals
enabling initial EMC analyses, and checks for compliance to military, US
national, and host nation spectrum standards. System developers will complete and obtain
approval for a DD Form 1494 during each phase of the acquisition process for
each newly developed spectrum-dependent system.
Were that it was that simple!
In
addition to the Frequency Allocation and Frequency Assignment processes, DoDI
4650.01 now requires the conduct of a Spectrum Supportability Risk Assessment
for the procurement of all spectrum dependent systems, including COTS. SSRAs will be required of programs at
milestone reviews A, B and C as part of the overall balance of program success
against future risks. A PM’s
failure to obtain spectrum supportability for components in
its systems has direct consequences to the program in meeting performance,
schedule and cost objectives established by its Acquisition Review Board and to
the Combatant Commander in meeting Joint Mission Area requirements.
The Risk Management Guide (RMG) for DOD
Acquisition defines Risk as a
measure of the potential inability to achieve overall program objectives within
defined cost, schedule, and performance/technical constraints and has two
components: (1) the probability/likelihood of failing to achieve a particular
outcome, and (2) the consequences/impacts of failing to achieve that outcome.
So just what is an SSRA?
It is an evaluation performed by DoD Components of all
S-D systems to identify and assess EM spectrum and Electromagnetic
Environmental Effect (E3) issues that can affect the required operational
performance of the overall system based on the mission needs defined by the
combat developer and/or Joint Staff in the ICD, CDD, and CPD.
The purpose of the spectrum supportability risk assessment is to identify
and assess regulatory, technical, and operational spectrum issues with the
potential to affect the required operational performance of the candidate
system. For example, in addition to
determining that a system’s bandwidth requirement complies with an individual
nation’s frequency allocation scheme, a new or modified system must also be
evaluated with respect to:
·
The system’s potential to cause interference to or suffer from other
military and civilian RF systems currently in use or planned for operational
environments.
·
The effect of the system’s proposed spectrum use on the ability of the
extant force structure to access the RF spectrum without interference.
·
How the system’s spectrum use conforms to the tables of frequency
allocation of intended host nations, ensuring regulatory protection from other
national co-band spectrum users.
·
If individual host-nation frequency allocations include enough bandwidth
to fully support the system’s operational mission, for example, required data
rate.
A Spectrum Supportability Risk Assessment provides
a formally documented SS risk assessment, with mitigation measure(s)
identified, to achieve a SS Determination from the FMO, CIO, or OSD(NII)
(depending on ACAT and/or level of Interest)
An SSRA should include the following components:
·
Regulatory component:
Addressing the compliance of the RF system with US national and international
tables of frequency allocation as well as with regulatory agreements reached at
the International Telecommunication Union.
·
Technical component:
Quantifying the mutual interactions between a candidate system and other
co-band, adjacent band, and harmonically related RF systems, including the
identification of suggested methods to mitigate the effects of possible mutual
interference.
·
Operational component:
Identifying and quantifying the mutual interactions among the candidate system
and other US military RF systems in the operational environment and identifying
suggested methods to mitigate for possible instances of interference.
SSRAs are produced in several stages including Initial,
Detailed, and Updated SSRAs
•
Each has a regulatory, technical,
and operational element
•
Detail and scope of each depends on:
•
the system’s entry point into the DAS,
•
its complexity,
•
the intended operational environment,
and
•
the maturity of its design.
When conducting an SSRA, operational restrictions, availability of
frequencies, host nation approval (HNA), and known incidents of electromagnetic
interference (EMI) must be considered. S-D systems and equipment cannot be
operated legally until they have been granted equipment spectrum certification
(ESC) by National and DoD authorities; in addition, a frequency assignment must
be obtained from the appropriate area frequency manager. For systems that will
operate outside the United States & Possessions, an HNA also is requested
prior to operation in each foreign country designated for use.
Additionally, the program must be monitored to determine the EMC and EMI
impact of any changes to such operational RF parameters such as tuning range,
emission characteristics, antenna gain and height, bandwidth, or output power,
etc. Changes to these parameters may
require additional E3 analyses or tests. The E3 Assessment should:
·
Identify and resolve co-site EMI issues during system acceptance
testing.
·
Demonstrate repeatable EMC utilizing appropriate development models.
·
Maintain system E3 design integrity during operations.
·
Implement procedures for EMI problem reporting.
The SSRA will include details of the following, for
each piece of S-D system:
–
Status of approved 1494s (or J/F 12’s )
–
Status of Host Nation Coordination via
the COCOMs
–
Provide/discuss known SS and E3 issues
and assigns RISK
–
Discuss potential operational impact of
known SS and E3 deficiencies
–
Provide program risk (R/Y/G) for each
system, a risk summary, and mitigation plans to reduce or eliminate YELLOW and RED issues
–
Provide an overall, Program assessment
for upcoming acquisition Milestones
•
Minimum E3 requirements:
•
Determine the potential for EMC and EMI interactions between the
proposed system and other systems, and with the anticipated operational EME.
•
Include an EMV analysis to determine the possible effect on operational
performance as a result of any EM interaction.
Available expertise and the existence of service
E3/SS related organizations notwithstanding, it is widely known in the DoD
Spectrum Management community that program offices, for a variety of reasons,
including a lack of understanding of the requirements and their importance,
frequently avoid spectrum supportability considerations early in program or
take them on belatedly at the expense of cost, schedule and operational
capability. The General Accounting
Office has documented a variety of issues related to the implementation of
spectrum management issues in DoD acquisition systems over the years. See the table in Appendix A.
So what are the obstacles that keep program offices
and acquisition personnel from complying with federal laws and DoD directives on
RF spectrum use and instituting good engineering practices on control of
electromagnetic environmental effects (E3)?
Volumes have been written on the need to comply with the spectrum
regulations but the list of infractions continues as does the list of radio
interference issues, both during acquisition and operationally. Current requirements and methods for
assuring that systems have spectrum access and electromagnetic compatibility
are scattered among a variety of DoD Directives, Instructions, MIL-STDs and
Handbooks; and they can be poorly defined with approval processes that are hard
to understand, slow, subjective and inconsistent. These volumes of requirements documents,
which currently define the processes for obtaining spectrum access, acquiring
authorized frequencies and controlling E3, have created complexities that can
inhibit successful implementation by program managers. Some of the requirements are technically
daunting on the surface, yet technical experts are available within every
military department to help as necessary.
The Basic Solution ·
The
good news is that there’s lots of guidance ·
The
bad news is that there’s lots of guidance
(1) Determine the spectrum required to support the mission and define the
intended EME in which the system will operate.
(2) Ensure E3 control and SS requirements are addressed in JCIDS and defense
acquisition system documentation.
(3) Apply interface standards such as MIL-STD-461 and MIL-STD-464 to ensure
that the system and its subsystems and equipment are built to operate
compatibly in the mission EME.
(4) Define E3/SS test objectives in the Test and Evaluation Master Plan
(TEMP) and allocate sufficient resources to conduct test objectives.
(5) Verify and document SS and E3 control issues during developmental and
operational test and evaluation.
(6) Conduct early E3 and SS operational assessments that consider the
intended mission including single Service, Joint, and international
deployments.
(7) Provide E3 assessments during operational test readiness reviews. Report
the operational impact, system limitations, and vulnerabilities from unresolved
E3 and SS problems.
Ideally, an initial
spectrum supportability assessment is generated in the first phase of the DoD
acquisition process. Early
identification of major regulatory and technical issues allows program
management personnel to focus attention and resources on critical spectrum
issues in the remaining acquisition phases.
The SSRA’s author uses inputs from several sources:
·
Technical
and regulatory information is obtained from DoD data bases, specifically the:
·
The latest
pertinent Host Nation supportability comments are obtained by the Program
Office from the Combatant Command (COCOM) spectrum managers. The COCOM spectrum managers will forward any
resulting comments to the authors of the SSRA.
·
The PMO
defines the system’s technical parameters and intended operational deployment
required for spectrum support, e.g. the frequency bands of interest and the
intended worldwide development, test and operational areas and host
nations.
Coordination with the
cognizant MILDEP FMO is a fundamental key to a successful SSRA. The MILDEP FMO should be made aware of initial
activities and be kept informed of major SSA developments. The PMO should provide the SSRA’s authors
with copies of any DD Form 1494s sent to the MILDEP FMO. The national and host-nation comments
resulting from previous J/F 12’s submissions should be reviewed to see what
comments may have been provided on earlier versions of the system.
The results from the
regulatory portion of an SSA can be summarized for senior leadership as a
“stoplight chart” where the colors of each box are an indication of the
possibility of a system obtaining spectrum supportability in the US and
selected host nations. In the example
below, reading the rows indicates that the frequency band used by at least four
of the program’s sub-systems will have major spectrum issues in many of the
intended host nations. Looking at the
columns indicates the possibility of obtaining spectrum support for specific
systems in specific host nations.
|
Program |
Combatant Commands |
|||||||||||||||||
|
NORTHCOM |
EUCOM/AFRICOM |
PACOM |
CENTCOM |
SOUTHCOM |
||||||||||||||
|
RF
Sub-system |
Frequency
(MHz) |
Radio
Service |
US |
MEX |
CAN |
UK |
GER |
Slovak |
S A |
Japan |
Korea |
Austr. |
Iraq |
UAE |
AFG |
VEN |
COL |
Brazil |
|
A |
1350 - 1390 |
Mobile |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
B |
1755 - 1850 |
Mobile |
|
|
|
1 |
1 |
1 |
|
|
1 |
1 |
|
1 |
|
|
|
1 |
|
C |
2400-2483.5 |
Mobile |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
D |
4400 - 4990 |
Mobile |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
E |
5470 - 5725 |
Mobile |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
= Little
chance of host-nation approval, or approval with many operational and regulatory
restrictions |
|||||||||||||||||
|
|
=
Operation allowed only with geographic, frequency, and/or operational
restrictions |
|||||||||||||||||
|
|
= Good
chance of host-nation approval with few operational and regulatory
restrictions |
|||||||||||||||||
|
1. Adopted
the GSM-1800 personal communications standard |
||||||||||||||||||
The colors result from a
careful comparison of the radio service of each RF system with the technical
and regulatory information contained in the databases and the host-nation
tables of allocation.
Likewise, the results of the Technical and Operational analyses
previously discussed, will constitute additional input into an overall risk
assessment. The technical component
would focus on the RF engineering related risks associated with possible mutual
interference with other systems in the same band and the operational would
focus on the risks of possible mutual interference within its intended
operational environment.
The major result of the
SSRA may be that the PMO considers options such as: changing the system’s spectrum use or other
technical parameters or beginning consultations with the cognizant FMO
regarding possible courses of action.
Typical courses of action include coordinating bi-lateral negotiations
with individual host-nations or briefing the spectrum requirements of the
system to spectrum for a such as the NATO Frequency Management Sub-Committee
(FMSC), the DoD spectrum Summit or various COCOM spectrum conferences. All PMO involvement with these groups must be
closely coordinated with the cognizant MILDEP frequency management office and
DoD representative.
Now What?
Hopefully, you realize
that Spectrum Supportability is not something that can be assumed; spectrum
demand is increasing and available spectrum is decreasing. The requirement to perform and submit SSRAs
is part of the DoD effort to ensure that we don’t continue to field systems
with spectrum and/or interference problems.
From the list of suggested tasks noted in DoDI 4650.01, you
will also realize that producing a meaningful SSRA is a significant engineering undertaking, not a task for the
faint of heart. An understanding of the
entire gamut of required information, the sources and availability of that
information and the technical ability to collate, analyze and present the data,
requires a specialized expertise and particular experience. And as a relatively new requirement,
knowledgeable, experienced help in producing and reviewing SSRAs can be hard to
find. EMC Management Concepts’ staff
have extensive experience in DoD spectrum and E3 requirements, we have experience
analyzing potential interference and RF interactions during program lifecycles
and we can help YOUR program minimize spectrum supportability risks.
You must – MUST – apply due diligence to
Spectrum Supportability considerations
–
It is a critical
tenet for program success
–
It requires
application of resources and knowledgeable people
–
You should apply
Spectrum Supportability resources early and “Up-Front” in a program life cycle
–
It will save
you potentially BIG $’s in the end
Contact
EMC Management Concepts to discuss your SSRA requirements:
Brian
Farmer, President
703-864-7023
Appendix
A
GAO Reports Related to DoD SM Management
Issues
|
Report |
Title & End Note |
Relevance |
|
NSIAD-87-42, 09 February 1987 |
Radio Frequencies: Earlier
Coordination Could Improve System Use and Save Costs [i] |
Found that delays and unnecessary
costs resulted when DOD did not coordinate with host nations early in the
development of communication systems |
|
GAO-01-604, 09 May 2001 |
DEFENSE SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT New Procedures Could Help Reduce
Interference Problems[ii] |
Reported that the new procedures
established by DOD are reasonable and, if successfully implemented, could
help prevent problems related to radio frequency interference. |
|
GAO-03-617R, 30 April 2003 |
Spectrum Management in Defense Acquisitions [iii] |
Reported that DOD’s weapons programs
have often failed to obtain, consider, or act upon adequate spectrum
supportability knowledge during the early stages of acquisition. This is essentially the same finding as the
NSIAD-87-42 report. |
|
GAO-04-530T, March 17, 2004 |
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Major management Issues
Facing DOD's Development and Fielding Efforts
[iv] |
Exemplifies the issue of lack of
spectrum supportability considerations before acquisition of systems. |
|
GAO-04-248, March 31, 2004 |
Assessments of Major Weapon Programs [v] |
Warns that technical challenges that
could affect the program include spectrum certification but is mute on the
broader requirement for spectrum supportability determination. |
|
GAO-04-858, July 28, 2004 |
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS The Global Information Grid
and Challenges Facing Its Implementation [vi] |
Warns that previous efforts that have
been undertaken in past years to foster interoperability among DOD systems
have had limited success. That DOD had
not yet overcome resistance from the military services, it lacked
architecture to guide interoperability efforts and some current oversight and
control mechanisms, such as the interoperability certification process, were
not working or were not being enforced. (Spectrum supportability is a consideration
within the Information Support Plan that is part of the interoperability
certification process.[1]) |
|
GAO-05-519T, April 6, 2005 |
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS Assessments of |
Reports: 1. B2B radar required major design
modification to resolve potential interference issues.. 2. TSAT program must resolve
communication-on-the-move nulling antenna, dynamic bandwidth and resource
allocation technologies however protected bandwidth efficient modulation
waveforms, information assurance communications—are scheduled to reach
maturity in early 2006, about 2 years after the start of system development
(MS B). |
|
GAO-05-669, 15 June 2005 |
Resolving
Development Risks in the Army's Networked Communications Capabilities Is Key
to Fielding Future Force [ix] |
Cluster 5 program officials had
expected to leverage technology from the Cluster 1 program. However, the
Cluster 1 technologies have not matured as anticipated. The unique technological challenge of its
wideband radio frequency capabilities up to 2500 MHz, introduce thermal
management and packaging, and complex security architecture risks for which
backup technology is to be identified as a part of a risk mitigation
plan. Therefore, spectrum
supportability assessments should have considered all alternatives. Presently
cluster 5 submission of a request the Equipment Spectrum (allocation)
Certification has not been completed so substantiated spectrum supportability
determinations have not been made. |
Appendix
B
DoDI
4650.01 Suggested SSRA Tasks
[i] P. 1, We recently reviewed the Department of Defense’s (DOD'S) efforts to coordinate the use of radio frequencies with European nations for command, control, and communication systems. We found that delays and unnecessary costs resulted when DOD did not coordinate with host nations early in the development of communication systems to ensure that the frequencies selected would be approved. (See app. I.) In a separate and broader review of communications in the Pacific theater, we
found a similar situation.
[ii]P. 5 We believe that the new procedures established by DOD are reasonable and, if successfully implemented, could help prevent problems related to radio frequency interference. However, evaluation of the impact of these new procedures cannot be accomplished until DOD has had a chance to
apply its revised guidance to systems as they go through each acquisition decision milestone. DOD would then be able to demonstrate that the new procedures have (1) resulted in the review of relevant documents at each decision milestone to identify potential frequency problems, (2) been or will be successful in helping to prevent interference problems, and/or (3) resulted in improvement of the acquisition process. No DOD system had undergone the new procedures for all decision milestones at the time of our review. According to DOD officials, the first of three pilot programs using the new acquisition guidance should be completed by January 2002. Consequently, the recency of changes in DOD’s new procedures precludes our assessment of their effectiveness at this time.
[iii] We found that DOD’s weapons programs have often failed to obtain, consider, or act upon adequate spectrum supportability knowledge during the early stages of acquisition. A majority of programs try to gain this knowledge at later stages, after key system development decisions may have been made. As a result, some programs experience significant delays, reduced operational capabilities, or the need for expensive redesign. More importantly, these programs missed opportunities to improve program results and avoid problems that are more costly to resolve late in development or fielding.
[iv] Recent operations are convincing
military commanders that UAVs are of real value to the warfighter. That success
on the battlefield is leading to more and more demand for UAVs and innovative
ways of using them, creating pressures such as a greater need for
interoperability of systems and competition for limited resources like money,
electromagnetic frequency spectrum, and airspace. The UAVs that are successful
today survived an environment characterized by a number of canceled programs,
risky strategies, uncoordinated efforts, and uncertain funding. It took
additional measures for them to succeed, not the least of which was strong
management intervention. In recent years, DOD has taken positive steps to
better manage the development of UAVs by creating the joint UAV Planning Task
Force and the UAV Roadmap. The question is whether these steps will be
sufficient to make the most out of current and future investments in UAVs. We believe
that DOD should build on these good steps so that it will be in a better
position to provide stewardship over these investments. Taking these steps will
give Congress confidence that its investments’ in the technology will produce
optimum capabilities desired of UAVs.
[v] P 80 Re JTRS Program, “ technical challenges that could affect the program include platform integration, networking, and spectrum certification.”
[vi] Additionally, previous efforts that have been undertaken in past years to foster interoperability among DOD systems have had limited success, principally because management tools and leadership attention were not strong enough to provide sufficient oversight and overcome resistance by the military services to forgo their unique requirements in favor of requirements that would benefit the department, as the following examples illustrate:
• In our 2001 report16 on DOD’s efforts to improve its ability to attack time-critical targets, we noted that DOD had undertaken numerous efforts to achieve system interoperability, including the development of guidance, oversight controls, directives and policies, and technology demonstrations. However, success was limited because DOD had not yet overcome resistance from the military services, it lacked an architecture to guide interoperability efforts and some current oversight and control mechanisms, such as the interoperability certification process, were not working or were not being enforced.
[vii] p31. The Air Force’s B-2 RMP is designed
to modify the current radar system to resolve potential conflicts in frequency
band usage. To comply with federal requirements, the frequency must be changed
to a band where the B-2 will be designated as a primary user. The modified
radar system is being designed to support the B-2 stealth bomber and its
combination of stealth, range, payload, and near precision weapons delivery
capabilities.
[viii] p 116 TSAT program Of the six technologies associated with the first increment, only one technology—the packet processing payloads—is mature. The other five— communication-on-the-move nulling antenna, dynamic bandwidth and resource allocation technologies, protected bandwidth efficient modulation waveforms, information assurance, and single access laser communications—are scheduled to reach maturity in early 2006, about 2 years after the start of development. The single access laser communications has no backup technology, and according to program officials, any delay in maturing this technology will cause the expected first satellite launch date to slip beyond 2012.
[ix] P. 24, The Cluster 5 program began system development and demonstration with immature technologies, especially those related to the handheld and smaller variants because of the limited size, weight, and power allowances (see fig. 5). According to the Army, the requirements for two-channel small form radios—wideband radio frequency capabilities up to 2500 MHz, thermal management and packaging, and complex security architecture— all introduce unique technological challenges. Cluster 5 program officials had expected to leverage technology from the Cluster 1 program. However, the Cluster 1 technologies have not matured as anticipated. Program officials stated that backup technology will be identified as a part of a risk mitigation plan.